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Abstract: This article focuses on the specific forms of power that are 
embodied in the properties and functions of formalised language, as it 
was used by Jiang Zemin in crucial political documents on the Party’s 
policy towards intellectuals. This inquiry illuminates various possibilities 
for the normalisation and inculcation of formalised language in the un-
derstudied decade of the 1990s, when the mantra “without stability, 
nothing can be achieved” became a tautology. The internal constitution 
of the selected texts is examined with an eye to the dialogic interaction 
with the production and reception of Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping’s 
political discourses on intellectuals (Mao 1942; Deng 1978). The analysis 
of language practices and discursive formations in a comparative per-
spective sheds light on the respective sociopolitical and historical con-
texts. It also reveals the extreme involutiondevolution of formalised 
language in the Jiang Zemin era, when “preserving stability” was reaf-
firmed as a crucial concern of the Party leadership with the ultimate aim 
of preserving its monopoly of power. 
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Chinese people don’t deserve a better life because “the quality of the 
Chinese people” is low. Believe me, people who say this are them-
selves of low quality. The Chinese people should not be given too 
much freedom due to China’s “unique situation”. Believe me, people 
who say this are themselves perpetuating China’s “unique situation”. 
Stability is what China needs the most, not freedom, not human 
rights. Believe me, people who say this are themselves contributing to 
instability (Murong 2011). 
Stability in China can be seen as a policy or a party-state position that is 
sustained by institutional arrangements, bureaucratic structures, and 
governmental practices (Heberer and Schubert 2009). But, foremost, 
stability is also a political discourse of power that has developed over 
time in combination with a sociopolitical ideal appealed to by the Chi-
nese Communist Party (CCP). The CCP’s concern for “preserving stabil-
ity” is profoundly reflected in the nexus between formalised political 
language and ideology, beginning with Mao Zedong’s 1974 emphasis on 
“stability and unity” (???? , anding tuanjie) (Mao 1998), although 
“without giving up the class struggle”, until the most recent paraphrasis 
orchestrated by Hu Jintao with his emphasis on the “harmonious so-
ciety” (????, hexie shehui) (Hu 2005; Holbig 2009). 
In the post-Mao era, Deng Xiaoping both reiterated Mao’s articula-
tion of his message stressing anding tuanjie and amplified it (Deng 1980a: 
219, 1980b: 318). Deng first coined the slogan “stability overrides every-
thing else” (??????, wending yadao yiqie). Just a few months before 
the Tiananmen movement and its tragic epilogue, during his conversa-
tion with U.S. President George H. W. Bush, on 26 February 1989, Deng 
argued: 
In China the overriding need is for stability. Without a stable envi-
ronment, we can accomplish nothing and may even lose what we have 
gained. […]. China is now in a period when it must concentrate on 
economic development (Deng 1989). 
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After 4 June 1989, the need to preserve stability, indeed, became the 
predominant feature of the CCP’s political and economic priorities. Ex-
actly one year after the event, Deng’s slogan became a mantra: Wending 
yadao yiqie was selected as the emblematic title of the Renmin Ribao editor-
ial on 4 June 1990. A few months after Deng Xiaoping’s death, Jiang 
Zemin in his speech to the 15th CCP National Congress, which was held 
in Beijing, 12–18 September 1997, echoed Deng’s idea and made it as-
cend to another form of absolute sine qua non: “Without stability, nothing 
can be achieved” (????????????, Meiyou wending, shenmeshi 
ye ganbucheng). Jiang has become identified with this slogan, which postu-
lates the axiomatic link between the triad of reform, development and 
stability:  
It is of the utmost importance to correctly handle the relations be-
tween reform and development on one hand and stability on the other 
so as to preserve a stable political and social environment. Without sta-
bility, nothing can be achieved (Jiang 1997). 
As the first Chinese leader unable to claim the revolutionary credentials 
of his predecessors and the first technocrat to ascend the political pan-
theon, Jiang’s primary responsibility was to safeguard the CCP legacy and 
institutionalise the reforms promoted by his predecessor, Deng Xiao-
ping. Therefore, Jiang’s absolute statement on preserving stability coin-
cided with the idea of preserving the regime of truth based on the axiom 
of the Party’s monopoly of power. Regime maintenance was for Jiang 
the sine qua non to pursue in order to attain the objectives of national 
development, as demonstrated in the speech that he pronounced on the 
20th anniversary of the launching of the “reform and opening up” (??
??, gaige kaifang) political program. On 18 December 1998, Jiang said:  
Stability is the basic premise for reform and development. Without sta-
bility, nothing can be achieved […]. In the process of carrying out reform, 
opening-up, and developing a socialist market economy, contradic-
tions among the people may notably increase, and some may even be-
come increasingly prominent […] We need to nip those factors that 
undermine social stability in the bud, no matter where they come 
from (??????????????, ba yiqie bu wending de yinsu xiao-
mie zai mengya) (Jiang 1998). 
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This article1 addresses the political discourse on preserving stability (??, 
weiwen), through the analysis of crucial political documents selected from 
numerous speeches that Jiang Zemin delivered on the Party’s policy 
towards intellectuals in the period 1990–1999. This was the decade when 
Jiang’s discourse on preserving stability was skilfully articulated to 
demonstrate the line of continuity with Deng Xiaoping, and the respect 
of his legacy, especially with regard to the role ascribed to intellectuals 
within Party politics (Deng 1979). 
The compound word weiwen is an abbreviation for ??????
(weihu shehui wending, preserve social stability), but the conundrum of what 
kind of stability is being preserved lies between the social and the politi-
cal since the ultimate goal of weiwen is, as poignantly argued by political 
scientist Yu Jianrong, to preserve the exclusiveness of the CCP’s political 
power. Yu Jianrong has coined the concept of “rigid stability” (????, 
gangxing wending) (as opposed to “resilient stability”, ???? renxing 
wending)  describe China’s state of stability, the premise of which is “an 
exclusive and closed nature of government power”. Yu Jianrong traces 
the origin of this power back to the historical legacy of Imperial China:  
For rulers, stability is always the ideal objective and state of affairs. In 
China traditionally, emperors pursued the ideal of a flourishing nation 
in which the people lived at peace as an ordered and harmonious 
whole (Yu 2010). 
Yu argues that:  
The combination of stability as the overriding priority  and as an of-
ficial evaluation criterion  and authoritarian political power has 
hardwired a political logic of pressure throughout China’s current pol-
itical system (Yu 2010). 
At the same time, the Chinese government aims to infuse “complete 
social calm” through state violence, a rigid control of ideology and an 
absolute governmentality of any form of social organisation. It is there-
fore axiomatic that any emerging seed of opposition (that is petitions, 
demonstrations, strikes, etc.) has to be “nipped in the bud” and con-
demned as an act of disorder and chaos. The aim of “preserving stabil-

1 My grateful thanks to the editor Dr. Karsten Giese for his thought-provoking 
comments and suggestions. The article has also benefited from advice and insight-
ful comments received from three anonymous peer reviewers. 
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ity” is to preserve the political power of the CCP. This became particu-
larly clear during the Jiang Zemin era. 
My focus derives from the fact that Jiang’s discourse on intellectuals 
has been understudied, despite the fact that it is extremely important, as 
this article intends to demonstrate, in understanding the relationship 
between the political use of formalised language and the conundrum of 
stability highlighted by Yu Jianrong. From the perspective of political 
language, the analysis of Jiang Zemin’s discourse reveals that Jiang 
avoided taking sides and instead used rehashed clichés and a slogan-like 
language in order to preserve the prerogatives of the elite. This political 
strategy had inexorable consequences on the political language, resulting 
in what I call a progressive devolution, and led to a critical disconnection 
between language and reality. 
			
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In the Chinese historical tradition the “correctness of language” (??, 
zhengming) has always been considered a source of moral authority, offi-
cial legitimacy and political stability (Makeham 1994; Yang 2007). Politi-
cal language has therefore been vested with an intrinsic instrumental 
value: its control represents the most suitable and effective way first to 
codify, and then widely convey, the orthodox state ideology.  
During the Maoist period, Chinese political discourse was character-
ised by what Michael Schoenhals (1992) defines as “formalised lan-
guage”. The “newspeak” developed and used by Party officials was a 
restricted code. It consisted of “correct” formulations (??, tifa), and 
aimed to teach the “enlarged masses” (??, dazhong) how to speak and, 
ultimately, how to think. As Ludwig Wittgenstein (1961) poignantly ar-
gued, words and sentences have the power to limit “expression of 
thoughts”, because the boundaries of language indicate the boundaries 
of one’s world.  
It will therefore only be in language that the limit can be set, and what 
lies on the other side of the limit will simply be nonsense (Wittgen-
stein 1961: 56). 
Robert Jay Lifton has investigated the conformity mechanism generated 
by a “loaded language”. Lifton argued that: 
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The language of the totalist environment is characterised by the 
thought-terminating cliché. The most far-reaching and complex of 
human problems are compressed into brief, highly reductive, defini-
tive-sounding phrases, easily memorised and easily expressed (Lifton 
1989: 429). 
He interprets totalist language as a system that is: repetitiously centered 
on all-encompassing jargon, prematurely abstract, highly categorical, 
relentlessly judging, and to anyone but its most devoted advocate, deadly 
dull.  
In my work, I consider formalised language as a discourse. In this 
article, I focus on Party policy towards intellectuals and explore how 
certain patterns and discursive formations (Foucault 1979: 153; Pêcheux 
1981a: 15–18, 1981b: 143–148) are used and reproduced in the docu-
ments that defined and presented this policy. I argue that there has been 
a progressive involution-devolution of formalised language from the 
Maoist period to the post-Mao era. After Mao Zedong’s death, under 
new political leadership, political language has progressively witnessed an 
inexorable “hollowing out”, that reached its climax with Jiang Zemin’s 
political discourse on intellectuals. 
The term involution literally indicates the action of enfolding or en-
tangling something, and alludes to a change of shape or degree, usually 
implying a move from higher to lower. The concept of involution is 
associated with the ideas of elaborateness, intricacy, or abstraction. 
The term devolution literally means “to roll downward” or “to fall”. 
In the context of social and political sciences, devolution implies transfer 
of authority or duties to a subordinate or substitute, or a process of pass-
ing down power from a central entity to local units, through successive 
stages. In the context of biological science, the term refers to a generally 
discredited idea that species or attributes may “degenerate” into more 
“primitive” states. I use both senses of the term “devolution” to investi-
gate the political discourse during the post-Mao era and, more specifical-
ly, the politics of language in defining the Party’s policy towards intellec-
tuals and “preserving stability”. What has emerged during the last 32 
years is a progressive struggle for the survival of a certain kind of politi-
cal language, along with the increasing emergence of subjective forms of 
expression, while formalised language, especially during the Jiang Ze-
min’s era, has become progressively abstract and disjointed from any 
kind of “claimed reality”. I use the term “claimed reality” in a Lacanian 
sense. The dominant political, cultural and mainstream media network 
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structures reality for us. Therefore, “claimed reality” refers to reality as 
people perceive it. It is a “virtual symbolic order” that Jacques Lacan 
calls the “big Other” (Lacan 2001). 
	
)
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) policy towards intellectuals was initially 
set by Mao Zedong, with his “Speeches at the Yan’an Forum on Litera-
ture and Art” (???????????? , Zai Yan’an wenyi zuotan 
huishang de jianghua), delivered on 2 May and 23 May 1942 (Mao 1942; 
McDougall 1980). 
Mao gave the Yan’an speeches in the middle of the “rectification 
movement”, which engaged the Party for three years from the enlarged 
meeting of the politburo in September 1941 until 1944. Mao’s funda-
mental goals in Yan’an were to define a common and coherent Party 
policy program and, consequently, to make the audience of his speeches 
adhere, both ideologically and stylistically, to orthodoxy. Attaining these 
goals was essential for the unification of the country under the Party’s 
rule, and simultaneously affirmed Mao’s personal power. Yan’an was the 
supreme moment in the formation of what David Apter and Tony Saich 
described as “a self-sufficient world of language, signs, and symbols in 
which only the initiated can belong” (Apter and Saich 1994: 99). The 
“initiated” had to learn, and learn by heart, Mao’s “theory and practice”. 
This consisted not only of new semantic categories, but even more so of 
discursive formations that embodied a new way of seeing and a new way 
of thinking, both about the wider world and about China’s self-position-
ing in that world. Ultimately, Mao’s discourse embodied a whole new 
system of values and beliefs. Mao exploited the potential expressiveness 
of the Chinese language, together with powerful metaphors and metony-
mies, to create what Apter and Saich describe as: 
a code out of elements of a semiology that enables the narrative to 
endow gesture, acts, dress, dwelling, and above all, language and liter-
acy with the power of signifiers, while the teleology arranges the signi-
fieds within a revolutionary frame (Apter and Saich 1994: 99).
Yan’an is the benchmark in defining a style that exhibits the way in 
which grammatical resources built into the Chinese language are used as 
tools of empowerment. The Yan’an speeches imply a correspondence 
between the signifiers and the signifieds, or, in Chinese epistemological 
terms, a connection between the triad of correct name (?, ming), correct 
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speech (?, yan), and reality (?, shi). Confucius taught that the art of 
government was based on the precept of giving correct names to things 
and acting accordingly:  
If names (?, ming) are not correct (?, zheng), then speech is not in 
accordance with the truth of things. If speech (?, yan) is not in ac-
cordance with the truth of things, then affairs (of the state) cannot be 
carried on with success (Legge 1960, Analects 13: 3).  
Confucius argued that good government is obtained only when all duties, 
defined by their names, are performed. This is the reason why, when one 
of his disciples asked: “What does it mean to govern?” Confucius gave 
an univocally clear answer: “To govern means to rectify the names” 
(Legge 1960, Analects 12: 17). 
Under Mao, the Confucian theory that connects “correct names” 
with correct governance was systematically implemented through vertical 
propaganda. A set of rules and conventions shared by the speaker (Mao) 
and the listeners defined a logocentric model that represented a claimed 
reality. These rules were so pervasive that they became encoded in pat-
terns, style, syntagmatic bonds and lexical items typical of formalised 
language. Speech then followed the expressive devices of regulated dis-
cursive formations. It was inculcated from the top-down and carried an 
intrinsic performative power. The linguistic behaviour and metalinguistic 
acts of every individual were supposed to accord with what was required 
of them. The new socialist man’s way of seeing and speaking was sup-
posed to meet a criterion of formal correctness. This was based on a 
claimed “harmony” between the name and the reality, and expressed by a 
codified and correct speech that had to be memorised and reproduced 
(Marinelli 2009). 
Thirty-seven years later, on 13 October 1979, in a historical context 
that had changed completely, Deng Xiaoping delivered a famous speech 
entitled “Greeting words to the Fourth Congress of Chinese literary and 
art workers” (Deng 1979: 207–214). This speech was made ten months 
after the ratification of the program for the “four modernisations” (agri-
culture, industry, science and technology, and defence), which had been 
launched during the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee 
of the CCP (18–22 December 1978). Deng’s speech set the scope of the 
Party’s “opening up” in the cultural sphere. It demonstrated the Party’s 
willingness to rehabilitate intellectuals in order to gain their support for 
its new policies, while at the same time clearly showing that requests for 
a so-called “fifth modernisation” (democracy) were unacceptable 	

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 Seymour 1980). Nevertheless, Deng’s political discourse on the 
Party’s policy towards intellectuals had passed a point of no return. On 
24 May 1977, Deng Xiaoping argued:  
We must create within the Party an atmosphere of respect for 
knowledge and respect for talented people (?????????, zun-
zhong zhishi, zunzhong rencai). The erroneous attitude of not respecting 
intellectuals must be opposed. All work, be it mental or manual, is la-
bour (Deng 1977: 54).  
Deng reiterated this view at the opening ceremony of the National Con-
ference on Science, held in Beijing on 18 March 1978. In this speech, he 
announced that instead of the policy of “uniting with, educating and 
remoulding intellectuals”, Chinese intellectuals had to be considered 
“part of the working class” (Deng 1979: 105). 
In my previous work, I have compared and contrasted Mao Zedong 
and Deng Xiaoping’s political language and the relevant discourses. Con-
centrating on the stylistic and expressive patterns of their most im-
portant speeches, I have shed light on the main features of the form of 
the “Mao Zedong system of thought” (??, sixiang) and the “Deng 
Xiaoping theory” (??, lilun). By highlighting symmetry and asymmetry, 
convergence and divergence, I showed a progressive evolutionary-
involutionary transition from the Maoist era to the post-Mao period 
(Marinelli 2009). There was a widening gap between the name and reali-
ty, due to the dissolution of any possible connection between the politi-
cal speech and the symbolic order representing reality. Analysis of Jiang 
Zemin’s political language during the transition from Deng’s leadership 
to Jiang’s ascent to power, especially with regard to the discourse on 
intellectuals, demonstrates that this gap became wider and, ultimately, 
unbridgeable. The widening of the gap between name and reality also 
had an impact on the discourse of “preserving stability”, since it invali-
dated any other possible contributions that intellectuals could have of-
fered, with the exception of supporting the Party to attain the goal of 
“stability overrides everything else”. 
	
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It is not easy to identify one single, crucial document that embodies the 
CCP’s policy towards intellectuals in the post-Deng period. I refer in 
particular to documents issued under Jiang Zemin, the leader who held 
the three key posts in the Chinese political universe: General Secretary of 
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the Chinese Communist Party (1989–2002), President of the People’s 
Republic of China (1993–2003), and Chairman of the Central Military 
Commission (1989–2004). Analysing these dates, it is clear that Jiang 
Zemin’s ascent to power began at the time of the Tiananmen crisis. Ef-
fectively, the final leadership transition, and the passing of the torch to 
Hu Jintao, occurred during the Sixteenth National Party Congress (8–15 
November 2002). With the incorporation of the “important thought” (?
???, zhuyao sixiang) of Jiang Zemin’s “three represents” (????, 
sange daibiao) into the Party Constitution in November 2002, and into the 
State Constitution by the National People’s Congress in March 2003, 
Jiang Zemin secured his place in history (Zhongyang jiwei bangongting 
and Zhongyang jiwei yanjiushi 2002+Fewsmith 2003). Scholars such as 
Lam (1999) and Gang and Hu (2003) have analysed Jiang Zemin’s politi-
cal work and thought, but less attention has been paid to Jiang’s language 
as a discourse. The analysis offered in the following pages concentrates 
on Jiang’s political discourse on intellectuals. The current investigation is 
based on a group of documents collected under the name “Intellectuals 
and the spiritual civilisation” (?????????, Zhishifenzi yu jingsheng 
wenming). The documents have been grouped under two categories: “The 
great historical mission of the intellectuals” (?????????????
Zhishifenzi weida de lishi shiming? and “Respect knowledge, respect talented 
people” (????????? , Zunzhong zhishi, zunzhong rencai) (Jiang 
1999a: 313–332). 
	"			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Building on Deng Xiaoping’s emphasis on the crucial role of intellectuals 
and the importance of their contribution to the cause of the “four mod-
ernisations”, Jiang Zemin spoke of “the great historical mission of the 
intellectuals”. As a faithful successor to Deng, Jiang argued that this 
mission harks back to the beginning of the “new China” on 1 October 
1949. But when he analysed the “key factors” of their contribution, he 
referred only to Deng Xiaoping and obliterated Mao Zedong: 
After the foundation of the new China, intellectuals became a part of 
the working class. They have been dynamic on every battlefront, and 
have made an enormous contribution to the creation of the socialist 
material and spiritual civilisations. The construction of modernisation 
is essentially based on economic competition between the countries 
and nationalities of the world; and modern economic competition es-
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sentially consists of both competition in science and technology and 
the competition of intellects. As comrade Deng Xiaoping has stated, 
in order to carry out modernisation, the key factors (??, guanjian) are 
science and technology, and the foundation (??, jichu) is education. 
It does not matter whether we look at the development of science and 
technology, or the development of education – neither of them can 
be realised without great efforts by intellectuals. We must rely whole-
heartedly on the working class, including intellectuals, who are a part 
of the working class. If intellectuals do not participate and we do not 
bring their activism into full play, it will be impossible to accomplish 
the construction of socialist modernisation (Jiang 1990a). 
Mao Zedong’s name has disappeared. This absence is conspicuous in all 
the speeches by Jiang Zemin on the Party’s policy towards intellectuals. 
The only reference is indirect, not to Mao as a political leader, but to 
“Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong thought”. In the speech “Patriotism 
and the Mission of Our Nation’s Intellectuals” (??????????
????, Aiguozhuyi he woguo zhishifenzi de shiming), given on 3 May 1990 
at the Public Meeting of the Youth of the Capital for the commemora-
tion of the May Fourth Movement, Jiang reiterated the continuity with 
Deng Xiaoping, expressing his commitment to raising the status of intel-
lectuals. Jiang reinforced the concept that intellectuals are an integral part 
of the working class, but he also emphasised that: 
Among the ranks of the working class, intellectuals represent the part 
which predominantly engages in mental activities, and they play an ir-
replaceable function in socialist modernisation, bearing a heavy social 
responsibility […] if intellectuals do not participate in (socialist) con-
struction and the victory of the reform policy, both become truly im-
possible (Jiang 1990b). 
Jiang continued:  
During the experience of the construction of modernisation and the 
reform and open-door program, we have realised very profoundly 
that, if we make a comparison with any previous historical period, the 
Chinese people have never done anything like today, in the sense of 
making such broad and urgent demands of their intellectuals (Jiang 
1990b).  
In the final part of his speech, Jiang emphasised that intellectuals were 
expected to “diligently study” Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong thought, 
to strengthen their “sense of national pride” and, ultimately, “to adhere 
to the fundamental line of the Party” (Jiang 1990b).  
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A fundamental asymmetry between Jiang Zemin’s discourse on intellec-
tuals, and the discourse that Mao initiated with the Yan’an speeches, is 
Jiang’s continuous and consistent use of the term zhishifenzi (????, 
intellectuals), instead of the previously more common wenyi gongzuozhe (?
????, artistic and literary workers), which was used to differentiate 
them from those intellectuals engaged in the science and technology 
field. In Jiang Zemin’s speeches, the term zhishifenzi seems to have ab-
sorbed this dichotomy, but without necessarily eliminating it or bridging 
the gap. 
During the Third National Conference on Science and Technology, 
held in Beijing from 25–30 May 1995, Jiang Zemin coined the slogan 
“Revitalise China through science and education” (???? , kejiao 
xingguo). During the first conference of this kind, held in 1956, Mao 
Zedong had put forward the slogan: “Strive to develop science” (???
??, xiang kexue jinjun). At the second conference, held in March 1978, 
Deng Xiaoping had declared that “the intellectuals are part of the work-
ing class”, while stressing the idea that “science and technology are pro-
ductive forces” (????????, kexue jishu shi shengchanli). At the 
third conference, when Jiang Zemin coined the slogan “Revitalise China 
through science and education”, he positioned himself in a line of conti-
nuity with Deng Xiaoping, in particular. He said: 
The scientists and the technicians are important pioneers of new pro-
ductive forces, and important propagators of scientific knowledge. 
They are the backbone of the construction of socialist modernisation. 
To implement the strategy of “Revitalising China through science and 
education”, talented people are the key factor (Jiang 1990b). 
In using the term zhishifenzi at a time in which “Revitalise China through 
science and education” was one of the key slogans, Jiang referred primar-
ily, and often exclusively, to intellectuals engaged in the science and 
technology field. These intellectuals were required to demonstrate their 
patriotism towards and support of the Party’s policy. 
Jiang Zemin’s slogan kejiao xingguo implies an inversion between the 
subject and the object, which emphasises the objective that the country 
aims to achieve. In other words, science and education must be first 
revitalised by the country. This indicates the commitment by the gov-
ernment to invest financially in scientific research and improve educa-
tional institutions (Jiang 1995). 
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In a speech given on 24 April 1992, Jiang Zemin emphasised the 
importance of “revitalising science and technology” (????, zhengxing 
keji). He also uses the expression keji yishi (????), which could be 
translated as “ideology of science”. This speech appears generic and 
ambiguous. However, Jiang’s speeches demonstrate that the improve-
ment of keji (science and technology) is strictly connected to the ostensi-
bly interrelated goals of GDP growth and economic development (Jiang 
1990b). Thus science and technology are indirectly presented as one of 
the fundamental preconditions for social stability, and, by extension, as a 
contribution to the authority of the CCP and its monopoly on power.  
From a linguistic point of view, the agency of the party-state is indi-
cated both by the parallel structure and by continuous use of the all-
encompassing plural personal pronoun “we”: 
Speeding up the training of excellent scientific and technological tal-
ents is an extremely urgent strategic task. We must bring into full play 
the important role of existing scientific and technical personnel. We 
must create a social environment which allows every individual to ful-
ly display his talents and use every talent to its utmost; unceasingly 
improving their working and living conditions; and fully stimulating 
their enthusiasm and creativity. We must conscientiously implement 
the “Outline for the Reform and Development of Chinese Educa-
tion”; vigorously develop education in accordance with the tendency 
of scientific and technological development and the needs of our 
country’s construction of modernisation; deepen the reform of the 
system of organisation for education; train and bring up millions of 
young talents in the scientific and technological sector; and build up 
great troops of scientists who will cut across the twentieth century 
[…] We must pay great attention to the training of young academic 
trailblazers and technical forerunners who will cross the twentieth 
century. We must do our best to create the environment and the con-
ditions to let outstanding young scientific and technological talents, 
especially the most outstanding, come into the open. We should ap-
point them to key positions where they will assume important respon-
sibilities. We should make them grow healthy in practice […]. 
In the future, we should continue to recommend the worthy and the 
able, beginning with the overall situation of the scientific and techno-
logical cause, which is flourishing and prosperous. We should push 
forward in the frontline the outstanding young scientific and techno-
logical talents, and support their groundbreaking work. We should de-
velop the spirit of discarding old ideas while bringing forth new ones. 
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The use of the plural personal pronoun we (??, women) responds to the 
tactic of “inclusiveness”: in using we, the Party documents seem to take 
it for granted that the intellectuals are univocally in accordance with the 
Party line and embody the Party spirit. 
There are two more traditional rhetorical tropes in this speech: the 
emphasis on youth, which harks back to the New Culture and May 
Fourth Movements, and the idea of state patronage of intellectual activi-
ties that contribute to the success of the nation.  
Jiang Zemin’s emphasis on a “great historical mission” for intellec-
tuals (Jiang 1990a) echoes the classical idea of the historical and political 
mission of the scholar-officials. However, Jiang’s concept reveals a loss 
of the traditional ethical connotation and privileges the patriotic contri-
bution of the intellectuals to the renaissance of the nation. 
According to the Confucian tradition, the scholar-official had the 
duty to be concerned with public affairs: to paraphrase Fan Zhongyan 
(989–1052), a prominent statesman and literary figure of the Northern 
Song dynasty, the scholar-official should “be the first person to show 
concern and the last one to enjoy comforts” (Fan 2002). 
This famous statement is also mentioned by Jiang Zemin (1990b). 
This is the epitome of the symbolic and emotional capital of the tradi-
tional Chinese scholar, whose role is embodied in the syllogism dushu 
zuoguan (????, study to become an official), and indicates a symbio-
tic relation between intellectual status and public function (Davies 2009; 
Marinelli 2012). This dyad is defined within a logocentric model of re-
presenting a claimed reality, which requires literati to perform their duty 
in accordance with the Confucian theory of “correct names” (?? , 
zhengming) (Legge 1960, Analects 13: 3: 1–5). This is both the fundamen-
tal tenet of successful governance and the fundamental source of politi-
cal legitimacy. 
Zhang Xudong has observed that after the Tiananmen crisis, intel-
lectuals were replaced with new bureaucratic and technocratic elites, who 
stood by the government despite its loss of moral authority (Zhang 
2001). Jiang Zemin played a key role in this. He saw the scientific elite as 
a stabilising force that could help to pre-empt a legitimacy crisis in the 
wake of the Tiananmen massacre. This group of scientific intellectuals 
was the target audience of Jiang Zemin’s speeches. 
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Jiang Zemin’s linguistic register is schematic and formulaic. It is a slogan-
like, highly generic and vague style. This is very different from Mao’s 
argumentative style, which was characterised by long paragraphs full of 
concrete examples, conveying definition and stability (Marinelli 2009). 
Jiang Zemin’s register is much closer to Deng’s, which it seems to mimic. 
It is a collection of scattered thoughts that reiterate Deng’s rehabilitation 
of the intellectuals and their “fine traditions” (?????, youliang de 
chuantong): the tradition of “loving their country”, the tradition of “unit-
ing with the people”, and the tradition of “struggling hard amid difficul-
ties” (Jiang 1990a).  
In the Chinese hierarchy of “correctness” (?, zheng) of political or-
thodoxy, after Mao Zedong’s sixiang (??, usually translated as “thought” 
but more appropriately as “ideology”), what followed was Deng Xiao-
ping’s “theory” (??, lilun), and then Jiang Zemin’s guannian (??), 
which literally means “ideas, concepts, viewpoints” but could also be 
translated as “thoughts”. Guannian is a compound word combining “ob-
servation” (?, guan) and “reading aloud/ study” (?, nian). It need not 
imply an overall systematic vision of Mao-style “theory and practice”. It 
(guannian) refers rather to a sequence of scattered thoughts, not neces-
sarily organised into an ideological theory. Jiang Zemin’s political dis-
course appears to “mix and match” sentences and ideas previously elab-
orated by Deng and, to a lesser extent, by Mao. Jiang assembled these 
“viewpoints” like a puzzle of words. His speeches reveal the use of lan-
guage as a discourse much more than a tool of communication, and 
consist of what appears to be a repetition of the same words and expres-
sions over and over. There is no more correspondence between name 
and reality, although some of his speeches still reveal a strenuous attempt 
to maintain the standardised enunciation format. An example of this 
technique is the speech that Jiang Zemin gave on 13 May 1999, in which 
the key words were: “upholding stability above all” (????????, 
jianchi wending yadao yiqie) and “the brutal aggression of the NATO forces 
led by the United States” (Jiang 1999b: 1–4). 
In numerous speeches, Jiang Zemin associated intellectuals with 
“socialist spiritual civilisation” (????????, shehuizhuyi jingsheng 
wenming). This concept was introduced by Deng Xiaoping in December 
1980, and has been on the CCP agenda since 1982. Broadly speaking, it 
encompasses both building a material civilisation (???? , wuzhi 
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wenming) and fostering people’s political consciousness, revolutionary 
ideals, morality and discipline. These were supposed to reflect the de-
mands of the “new period” (???, xin shiqi), but have communist ide-
ology at their core. Within the framework of “Deng Xiaoping theory”, 
the discourse of “spiritual civilisation” is an attempt to formulate a mas-
ter narrative for a “new” social structure, in line with a “new” vision of 
the future that aimed to enlist mass support to combat the spread of 
undirected popular culture. Underlying the search for a modernised cul-
ture “with Chinese characteristics” (??????, you Zhongguo tese de), 
the post-Deng era raised broad questions such as: What is the proper 
course for modern China? And through what combination of Chinese 
identity and reform can we (the Party) best preserve our self-respect? 
The new culture was meant to be based on economic modernisation, and 
reflect it, but also to combat (in the eyes of the leadership) the sleaziness 
and the negative social aspects of commercialism and consumerism. 
These issues became the object of intellectual critical inquiry and were 
widely debated in the 1990s (Davies 2009; Wang 2003). 
Various attempts to envision a “spiritual socialist civilisation” failed 
to coalesce into visual propaganda that could provide clear instructions 
for popular performance, a form to which the Chinese people had grown 
accustomed. Analysis of the visual rhetoric of the political posters and 
slogans that appeared during the new “spiritual civilisation” campaign 
from 1996 to 1997 demonstrates that visual imagery had fallen into dis-
use and only words survived, words which were reduced to signifiers that 
were totally disembodied from the relevant signifieds. The post-Mao era 
in general, and the 1990s in particular, saw the emergence of an increas-
ing gap between mimicry and reality. As opposed to the simple, single 
and reasonably predictable propaganda messages of previous decades, 
visual instructions for behaviour became increasingly multi-layered and 
confusing, containing conflicting attitudinal stimuli and instructions for 
“proper” behaviour. For example, “allowing a proportion of people to 
get rich first” (?????????, rang yibufen ren xianfu qilai), or, in its 
abbreviated version, the “getting rich” mentality, was first hailed as a 
glorious undertaking with beneficial and educational effects, but has 
subsequently been deplored as “worship of money”. 
The predominance of disembodied words in the political campaign 
for the promotion of a “socialist spiritual civilisation” reveals the disinte-
gration of the claimed relation between the name and the reality via 
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speech, a correlation which was a major characteristic of political dis-
course in Mao’s China.  
Chinese formalised language in the 1990s, of which Jiang Zemin’s 
speeches are an outstanding example, appears more and more detached 
from the realities of China. The crucial issue is to evaluate:  
 whether and to what extent the loss of a shared system of reference 
associated with a claimed reality can be replaced by a mimetic re-
presentation of the political realm, and  
 whether the use of language as a discourse is an effective strategy 
for “preserving stability” and, ultimately, preserving the Party’s au-
thority.  
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A major characteristic of Jiang Zemin’s discourse is the absolute lack of 
any possible visual correlations or any direct examples from his own 
experience, in sharp contrast to Mao’s speeches. There are neither asso-
ciated images nor indications of “good models” (???, haobangyang) to 
be emulated. Jiang’s references to the necessity of respecting and protect-
ing intellectuals remain vague. Even when he said,  
The members of the older generation of scientific and technical per-
sonnel have especially become models for the development of a spirit 
of sacrifice, examples of dedicating themselves to the benefit of the 
people and the interests of the country (Jiang 1991), 
he did not provide any examples. This development demonstrates the 
objective side of the dematerialisation of language, revealing an increas-
ing dichotomy between the name and the reality. In official documents 
there is a tendency to avoid comprehensive positive behavioural instruc-
tions, even though at a popular level the technique of role-modelling 
continues. An example is the “Top Gun” style fighter pilot, Wang Wei, 
who was eulogised post-mortem as a national hero after he was killed in 
a collision with a US navy surveillance aircraft in 2001 (Brookes 2002; 
Lindsey et al. 2001). Analysis should probably take into consideration the 
increasingly heterogeneous character of Chinese society in the 1990s, a 
society in which different social, generational and occupational groups 
emerged and the so-called “masses” could no longer be treated as an 
undifferentiated entity.  
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Another important feature of Jiang Zemin’s speeches is that many 
words belong to a predominantly economic or technological vocabulary, 
even though some military words survive (mainly??, duiwu, meaning 
“troops”, or ???? , sixiang wuqi, meaning “ideological weapons”) 
(Jiang 1991). There is an overarching emphasis on “science and technol-
ogy” (????, kexue jishu), which demonstrates that the main interest 
of the leadership is to secure the support of intellectuals in the science 
and technology field for the economic reform program. Jiang Zemin 
intended to link keji (??, science and technology, a common abbrevia-
tion of ????, kexue jishu) with jiaoyu (??, education). He clearly 
stated that “the key factors are science and technology, the foundation is 
education” (???????????, guanjian shi keji, jichu zai jiaoyu) 
(Jiang 1990a). The link between these two “concepts” and the expected 
role of intellectuals is indicated in the formulation: liangge dou libukai 
zhishifenzi de nüli (?????????????, the two [science and 
education] cannot exist without the efforts of intellectuals). This state-
ment implies that intellectuals are expected to “do their utmost” in 
“working hard” and “making great efforts” to enforce these guidelines 
under the leadership of the CCP.  
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Jiang Zemin often used the character zhì fourth tone (?, intelligence) from 
zhihui (??, wisdom). However, when he referred to intellectuals, he used 
the traditional near-homophone zh first tone (?), from the compound 
word zhishi (??, knowledge). This is noteworthy because some intellec-
tuals and scholars specialising in “the question of the intellectuals” (??
?????, zhishifenzi de wenti), have emphasised the importance of a 
new conception of zhi (?, stemming from ??, zhihui) and coined a 
new term zhìshifenzi (????) that replaces the “old” zhi (?) with the 
“new” one (?, zhi) (Xie 1999: 2). This debate relates to an old discus-
sion, which harks back to the May Fourth Movement and the appear-
ance of the “new intellectual”. Jiang Zemin’s use of zhi (?) as in “wis-
dom” need not demonstrate a willingness to take a position in this de-
bate. Nevertheless, I believe that the appearance of this character in his 
speeches may indicate the necessity of continuing the discussion about 
the category of “intellectual” and the paradigms of intellectual inquiry in 
China today. 
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Jiang Zemin’s speeches reveal an unresolved legacy of the past. This 
is another fundamental premise, strictly connected to the Party’s authori-
ty and political legitimacy. Jiang clearly wanted to show that his legacy 
derived from Deng’s epochal change in the CCP’s policy towards intel-
lectuals, with his formulation, at the second National Conference on 
Science, that “intellectuals are part of the working class” (??????
???????, zhishifenzi shi gongren jieji de yibufen). The attempt to con-
struct a further line of continuity lies in Jiang’s efforts to assert that this 
is not an innovation of the Deng era, but has been true since 1949 (Deng 
1979: 105; Jiang 1990a). Jiang wanted to demonstrate, in this way, the 
existence of a shared understanding regarding the status of intellectuals 
between Mao and Deng, which is hard to prove. Jiang tried to present 
this as one of China’s “fine traditions”, a vague and elusive term. Among 
Deng’s speeches concerning intellectuals, Jiang referred many times 
(Jiang 1995) to the speech epitomised by the slogan zunzhong zhishi, zun-
zhong rencai (?????????, Respect knowledge, respect talented 
people). As explained before, the speech was delivered by Deng Xiao-
ping on 24 May 1977, when Deng officially rehabilitated mental labour 
(Deng 1979: 54). 
However, in the speech delivered on 26 May 1995 Jiang seemed to 
contradict himself by discrediting zhishi (??, knowledge) in favour of 
rencai (??, talented people), while Deng in his slogan puts “knowledge” 
before “talented people”. In that speech, Jiang stated, “To implement 
the strategy of revitalising China through science and education, talented 
people are the key factor” (??????????????, shishi kejiao 
xingguo zhanlüe, guanjian shi rencai). This expression, when analysed in the 
context of the whole speech (Jiang 1995), seems to demonstrate that 
Jiang’s real intention was to guarantee the Party the support of “person-
nel trained in science and technology” (????, keji rencai), who could 
contribute, with their inventions and scientific work, to the progress of 
the country and, as a corollary, to the legitimacy of the CCP. Michel De 
Certeau proposes a significant distinction between authority and power: 
“Whatever is credible has ‘authority’; whatever is imposed has power” 
(De Certeau 1997: 87). Jiang Zemin, in his speeches, did not seem to be 
particularly interested in the work of writers and artists, and there is no 
reference to any kind of creativity that is not linked to the practical pos-
sibility of using the outcome as a tool for legitimisation of Party policy. 
Jiang’s “thoughts” reveal an extremely functional approach: the scien-
tists’ support is the sine qua non for strengthening the credibility of the 
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official representation of the achievements of the economic reform pro-
gram, and therefore helps to preserve the Party’s monopoly of power. 
Jiang’s speech dated 4 April 1990 clearly reveals his attempt to draw 
a line of continuity between his ideas and an ill-defined “tradition”. 
Jiang’s expression “(Chinese) intellectuals have created their own fine 
traditions” is a typical example of the double-edged sword of “truth” 
typical of Chinese political language, and more broadly of political lan-
guage in general. Perry Link (1999), in his analysis of Chinese language, 
defines two categories of “truth”, the first one is zhen de zhenli (????, 
the real truth) and the other one is jia de zhenli (????, the false truth). 
Link uses these two terms in a thought-provoking article in which he 
analyses the question of human rights (??, renquan) in China. He argues 
that any critique of Chinese records on human rights is presented in 
formalised language as a way to ????????? (shanghai Zhongguo 
renmin de ganqing) which literally means “to offend the sentiments of the 
Chinese people”, but according to the criterion of the “real truth”, this 
expression means (for the Chinese government): “we reject any attempt 
at interference”. Using Link’s categories, one could argue that “the real 
truth” of Jiang’s expression: “their own (??, ziji) fine traditions” actual-
ly alludes to the “fine traditions” of the Party, and not those of the intel-
lectuals. As Jiang explained, the expression “fine traditions” refers, in 
reality, to the guidelines of the general CCP policy based on three key 
axioms: the tradition of loving one’s country (????, aiguozhuyi), the 
tradition of uniting with the people (????????? , he renmin 
xiangjiehe de chuangtong), and the tradition of struggling hard amid difficul-
ties (???????, jianku fendou de chuantong) (Jiang 1990a). 
Continuing with the analysis of this speech, it appears that the intel-
lectuals who have been rehabilitated and are now presented as “a part” 
(???, yibufen) of the working class (????, gongren jieji) are no longer 
required “to serve the people”. This would contradict the Maoist criteri-
on which allegedly implied the subordinate relationship of the intellectual 
to “the people”, but in reality to the Party. Theoretically, the intellectuals 
are now presented as being on the same level (????, xianghu jiehe), 
even though they would be obliged to “merge with the people”. Could 
one deduce from this that Maoism is definitely dead? Not exactly, since, 
for example, the expression used by Jiang Zemin, jianku fendou de chuang-
tong (???????, struggling hard amid difficulties), is a typical Mao-
ist slogan, which demonstrates the legacy of the past, to indicate an in-
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clusive attitude towards the intellectuals who are called to support the 
Party’s policies. 
Jiang’s speeches on intellectuals all seem to come to the same con-
clusion: the success of “the construction of socialist modernisation” (?
????????, shehuizhuyi xiandaihua jianshe) is not even conceivable 
without the contribution of intellectuals. In Chinese political language, 
this conclusion remains vaguely expressed. Judging from the superficial 
structure, it appears to indicate a future direction, while the underlying 
structure implies that the final question of how to use the intellectuals 
(which harks back to the language problem) has not been solved. 
The word “modernisation” (???, xiandaihua) was a keyword at 
the end of the 1970s and remained so during the 1980s; it was the pinnacle 
of the “four modernisations” (??, sihua) rhetoric. It has now almost 
disappeared from informal language, though it remains in the formalised 
language, even though it is often replaced by the catchphrase “economic 
globalisation” (?????, jingji quanqiuhua). The same change is evident 
in the textbooks that university students must read for their courses on 
“social moral education” (????, shehui deyu) (classes once simply called 
“politics” (??, zhengzhi)). 
In his speeches, Jiang Zemin often referred to the “zeal” or “activ-
ism” (???, jijixing) of intellectuals, using a term which might sound as 
if it carried a positive connotation but, in reality, is extremely vague and 
ambiguous. In the course of interviews that I conducted with intellectu-
als on the policy of the CCP toward intellectuals (Marinelli 1994), two of 
the most important words to emerge were “creativity” (???, chuang-
zaoxing) and “faculty for discrimination and judgment” (???, panduan-
li). Only the first of these two terms appears in both Deng and Jiang’s 
speeches (Jiang 1997). 
Furthermore, two verbs became ever more common when referring 
to policy relating to intellectuals in the post-Mao era: ?? (luoshi) and ?
? (guanche). Both mean to “carry out” or “implement” (plans or policy), 
and they have a strong commandatory tone.  
While Deng was paramount leader, the commonly-used verb was  
luoshi, particularly in relation to Party policy towards intellectuals, so that 
when referring to “the question of the intellectuals” (???????, 
zhishifenzi de wenti), the “correct” expression was luoshi dang dui zhishifenzi 
de zhengce (???????????, implementing or carrying out the 
Party’s policy toward intellectuals). Luoshi has two main functions: as an 
adjective it means “practicable” or “workable” (literally: capable of be-
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coming reality; being implemented), while as a verb it can mean either 
“to fix (or to decide) in advance” or “to carry out, implement, put into 
effect”. Of course, in this context, luoshi is usually translated as “carry 
out”, but it could be inferred that the underlying meaning of this expres-
sion could also contain the nuance “to carry out a policy that is set and 
fixed in advance”. In Jiang’s speeches, he seemed to prefer the verb 
guanche, which has the meaning “to carry through” or “to implement”, 
but has the nuance of something that follows in a continuous line, since 
the character guan (?) conveys the act of “linking together” (??, lian-
guan), and suggests a continuous line from the past to the final aim, along 
which the action must now be carried through right to the end. 
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The CCP leadership has always invoked the key tenet of “preserving 
stability” (weiwen). This concept is profoundly embedded in the tradition-
al political culture: a line of continuity could be traced back to the Con-
fucian canon’s ideal of “Great Harmony” (Datong), which was reedited by 
the reformer Kang Youwei with his 1915 visionary utopian treatise enti-
tled exactly Datongshu (Book of Great Harmony).  
The political discourse on intellectuals (for instance, their status, 
their function and objectives vis-à-vis the Party) is extremely important 
in understanding the specific nexus between the formalised use of politi-
cal language and the ideological tool of “preserving stability”. However, 
the political discourse on intellectuals has so far been understudied. This 
article is the first study to focus on Jiang Zemin’s discourse on intellectu-
als through the lens of formalised language. This article demonstrates 
that Jiang Zemin’s speeches represent a new extreme of involution-de-
volution of formalised language. In Chinese political discourse, intended 
as a system of representation, formalised language presupposes the crea-
tion of an effective or, at least, a claimed relationship between the name 
and the reality via the speech. The speech has been completely sup-
pressed and obscured by Jiang’s slogan-like speaking style, which repeats 
the key concepts of Deng’s discourse, with the only aim of re-emphasis-
ing the predominance of “stability overrides everything else” (????
??, wending yadao yiqie) in Jiang’s newly revised version: “Without stabil-
ity, nothing can be achieved”. The primary intention of Jiang’s discourse 
is to reaffirm Deng’s concern with the rehabilitation of intellectuals: 
intellectuals’ support of the Party’s policies is essential to guarantee the 
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“modernisation” of the country, which is based on the axiomatic link 
between the three elements of reform, development and stability. But 
Jiang’s political language moves within a circular trajectory: its aim is to 
guarantee that any possible contradiction to the overarching aim of sta-
bility is nipped in the bud. Therefore, the intellectuals are required to 
strengthen their “sense of national pride” and, ultimately, “to adhere to 
the fundamental line of the Party” (Jiang 1990b). 
The syntagmatic bond between the name and the reality, which 
characterised Mao Zedong’s time (and its simulacra), derived both from 
an extremely precise choice of lexical items and their consequent organi-
sation in precise sentence patterns, which were based on a precise 
rhythm, rhyme scheme, and discursive formations, associated with spe-
cific visual imagery. A typical example is the attribution to Mao Zedong 
of three extremely positive and high-sounding adjectives, “Great, be-
loved and wise Chairman Mao” (?????????????, weidade, 
jing’ai, yingming de Maozhuxi), which associated the portrait of the Great 
Helmsman with the image of the “morning sun”. This connection be-
tween imagery and language has progressively disappeared in the post-
Mao era. The Chinese characters used in Jiang Zemin’s speeches lack any 
concrete reference to a claimed reality; the sign has no more association 
with its referent. Using Chinese epistemological terminology, this reveals 
that political language in the 1990s, following Jiang’s goal of “stability 
über alles”, reached a point of no-return. The gap between the name and 
the reality had become unbridgeable due to the dissolution of any possi-
ble connection between political speech and the symbolic order of repre-
sentation of the reality. In this sense, Jiang’s political discourse presented 
a serious ambiguity. The alleged correspondence, a priori, of name and 
reality had progressively dissolved to the extent of revealing the weakest 
link in Jiang’s language: his inability to clarify the precise relationship 
between reform, development and stability. Jiang insisted that: 
During the course of the modernisation drive, we pay extra attention 
to properly handling the relations among reform, development and stability. 
Economic development is central to all our undertakings, with reform 
being the driving force for development, development being the founda-
tion for social stability and prosperity, and stability being the precondi-
tion for economic growth and smooth implementation of reform 
(Jiang1996. Italics added). 
However, in reality, Jiang’s political discourse on intellectuals blurred the 
three categories (reform, development, and stability) and seemed to point 
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in the unilateral and contradictory direction that “preserving stability” 
was both the absolute premise and the supreme goal. In the 1990s, the 
mantra “without stability, nothing can be achieved” became a tautology. 
The obsession with “preserving stability” ultimately demystified the pri-
ority of Jiang’s personal cause, behind his alleged concern with “using 
law to rule the country and protect the country’s prolonged order and 
long peace” (?????????????, yifa zhiguo, baozhang guojia 
changzhi jiu’an) (Jiang 1997; Liu 1996: 1). 
A possible explanation of Jiang’s obsession with stability and his 
strategic avoidance to take sides is offered by Willy Wo-Lap Lam, who 
argues that:  
The keyword for Jiang was stability: maintaining a balance among the 
disparate forces in society and the Party so that there would not be a 
direct challenge to his ruling elite (Lam 1999: 43. Italics added).
In the Jiang Zemin period, language took on a ritualistic quality, in which 
appeals to stability as the precondition for development became the 
utterances that proscribe the limits of political and social action in China 
today. 
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